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With the end of intermediate exchange rate regimes, countries 
are either abandoning domestic monetary policy (by choosing 
super-hard  pegs  or  relinquishing  their  national  currencies 
altogether) or strengthening independent monetary policymaking 
(by adopting floating exchange rates, of either the clean or dirty 
variety) (Fischer, 2001; Calvo and Mishkin, 2003). Among monetary 
regimes, inflation targeting has become the natural complement 
of flexible exchange rate regimes. Many countries—which differ 
in size, structural features, and development level—have selected 
inflation-targeting-cum-floating as their preferred framework for 
pursuing a more independent and effective monetary policy. This 
choice is often made by instrument-independent central banks in 
open economies with a history of inflation, which need to establish 
a credible monetary anchor to promote price stability (Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002). Therefore, since New Zealand first adopted 
inflation targeting in 1990, a steadily growing number of industrial 
and emerging economies have implemented an explicit inflation 
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target as their nominal anchor. Eight industrial countries and 
seventeen emerging economies currently have full-fledged inflation 
targeting in place, and many more emerging economies are planning 
to adopt inflation targeting in the next few years.
The theory and practice of monetary policy under inflation 
targeting have evolved hand in hand, with mutually beneficial 
effects. Academic researchers and central bankers are collaborating 
in analyzing monetary theory and policy results, as well as improving 
policy design and conduct, in both inflation-targeting and nontargeting 
central banks. This collaboration gives rise to joint academic–central 
bank research, conferences, and publications, like the one for which 
this introduction is written.
Several volumes have been published on the theory, design, 
implementation, and performance of inflation-targeting regimes, 
including Haldane (1995), Leiderman and Svensson (1995), Lowe 
(1997), Bernanke and others (1999), Bank of Thailand (2000), Carson, 
Enoch, and Dziobek (2002), Loayza and Soto (2002), Truman (2003), 
Reserve Bank of Australia (2004), and Bernanke and Woodford (2005). 
These works typically combine the study of theoretical questions on 
monetary theory and policy design under inflation targeting with 
new empirical evidence on policy and macroeconomic performance, 
based on the growing body of data pertaining to the rising number of 
inflation-targeting countries. 
In the following section, we selectively review the literature on 
inflation targeting. We then discuss the new research on monetary 
policy under inflation targeting introduced here (in this volume) and 
summarize its main findings.
1. A SELECTIVE REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON INFLATION 
TARGETING
A large and growing literature focuses on monetary theory, 
monetary policy, and macroeconomic performance under an inflation-
targeting regime. This is part of a much larger analytical and empirical 
literature on monetary theory and policy outcomes. The boundaries 
between the general research and that referring specifically to inflation 
targeting are sometimes blurred, as is clear in this review. Considering 
the latter fact and the sheer size of the current research, we focus 
selectively on six issues of monetary policy design and practice that 
are of central relevance to the inflation targeting debate.
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1.1 Practice and Optimality of Inflation-Targeting 
Regimes 
A growing literature addresses the optimal choice of the 
parameters that define an inflation-targeting regime. While all 
countries have formally chosen inflation over price-level targeting to 
date, the debate about the optimality of inflation versus price-level 
targeting has not been closed. Inflation targeting dominates price-level 
targeting in riding out temporary inflation shocks and in avoiding 
costly contractionary policy offsets and excessive inflation variability 
(Fischer, 1996). Price-level targeting, however, may do a better job 
than inflation targeting in avoiding a random drift in the price level 
and reducing price-level uncertainty (Fischer, 1996); in delivering 
lower output and inflation volatility (Svensson, 1999; Chadha and 
Nolan, 2002); in allowing relative prices to allocate resources and 
reducing distortions and unintended wealth transfers (Barnett and 
Engineer, 2000); and in lessening the problems associated with the 
zero nominal interest floor (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Svensson, 
2003). Hybrid rules that combine inflation and price-level targeting 
may be superior to either of the two extremes (Cecchetti and Kim, 
2005; Nessén and Vestin, 2005).
Most countries have chosen the headline consumer price index (CPI) 
as their target measure; alternative measures based on core inflation 
measures are exceptions. While there are good practical arguments for 
choosing the headline CPI as the official measure (including its status 
as a widespread and trusted measure of overall inflation and its use for 
indexation), the literature identifies several reasons that alternative 
price-level measures are potentially a better choice. Central banks are 
more likely to have stronger and quicker effects on core inflation than 
headline inflation and on nontradable than tradable goods inflation. 
When the production of final consumption goods involves different 
stages of processing, it may be optimal for monetary policy to react not 
only to output and CPI variability, but also to producer price inflation 
variability (Huang and Liu, 2004). Countries have not chosen nominal 
income as their target measure for a variety of reasons, including the 
lack of readily available high-frequency data on gross national income 
and the equal weight attached to inflation and output in nominal income. 
Nevertheless, nominal-income targeting may be superior to inflation 
targeting under certain conditions (McCallum and Nelson, 1999).
Another design dimension of an inflation-targeting regime is the 
monetary policy horizon—that is, the time targeted by the central 
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bank to return inflation to the target level after an inflation shock. 
The optimal horizon will depend on the nature and persistence of 
the shock, the structure of the economy (including the extent of 
nominal and real rigidities), and central bank preferences (Batini and 
Nelson, 2001). The discussion of the optimal horizon is also linked to 
the choice between inflation and price-level targeting (King, 1999; 
Cecchetti and Kim, 2005).
1.2 Inflation Targeting and Optimal Monetary Policy
Recent research follows the advice of McCallum (1988) and 
investigates the robustness properties of alternative monetary 
policy rules by evaluating them in a variety of models. However, the 
dichotomy between economic structure and policy objectives could be 
inappropriate. First, the central bank’s quadratic loss function can be 
interpreted as an approximation of the welfare of the representative 
agent (Woodford, 1993). Second, loss functions are endogenous to 
model structure; for example, increased price rigidity raises the 
relative weight of the inflation objective in the optimal loss function 
that an inflation-targeting central bank should use (Walsh, 2004). 
Researchers generally agree that inflation targeting has led to 
major progress in the practice of monetary policy (see, for example, 
Woodford, 2004). The early literature that describes inflation targeting 
as a regime of constrained discretion (Bernanke and others, 1999) 
underscores its potential benefit of allowing sufficient discretion 
(as required in the face of policy uncertainty) within a rule-based 
framework that is consistent with Kydland and Prescott’s rules versus 
discretion paradigm (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977). 
Yet is monetary policy as currently practiced by inflation-targeting 
central banks optimal? Many authors point to the suboptimality of 
implicit policy rules and weakness in communicating policy rules, 
internal evaluations, and projections of future policy and performance 
variables to the public. The optimal targeting rules derived by Giannoni 
and Woodford (2005) imply forecasts for interest and inflation paths 
several years into the future, which are inconsistent with assumptions 
of constant future interest rates and constant medium-term policy 
horizons, as still practiced by several inflation-targeting central banks. 
Other authors call for clear central bank communication of point and 
density forecasts for their policy instrument and objectives, as well 
as their likely course of policy under alternative or risk scenarios 
(Svensson, 1997; Faust and Henderson, 2004; Woodford, 2004). 
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1.3 Uncertainty, Learning, and Monetary Policy under 
Inflation Targeting
Central bankers face different types of uncertainty that may 
affect monetary policy decisions, such as uncertainty about current 
(real-time) and future data, the most appropriate model (including 
specification, parameters, and the dynamics that govern monetary 
policy transmission), and preferences (of the representative consumer 
and even of the central banker). Brainard (1967) was the first to 
explore how a (monetary) policymaker should respond to uncertainty, 
showing that if uncertainty is additive, a policymaker with a quadratic 
objective function should display certainty equivalence. A more 
cautious policy is optimal, however, if uncertainty is multiplicative 
(Brainard’s conservative principle). If uncertainty is Knightian—that 
is, when probability distributions over possible events are unknown—
robust control methods lead policymakers to minimize the loss that 
arises when uncertainty turns out to be most unfavorable (Hansen 
and Sargent, forthcoming).
Early work on inflation targeting under uncertainty suggests 
that parameter and lag uncertainty should have little effect on policy 
behavior, while uncertainty about the nature of shocks tends to raise 
interest rate smoothing (Srour, 1999). For the case of parameter 
uncertainty, and in the framework of the Svensson (1999) model, 
forward-looking expectations imply that a more aggressive monetary 
policy yields greater stability than interest rate smoothing (Demertzis 
and Viegi, 2004). Uncertainty about key natural rates (namely, 
natural unemployment and interest rates) can result in persistent 
monetary policy errors (Orphanides and Williams, 2002; Cukierman 
and Lippi, 2005) and propagate macroeconomic disturbances, with 
first-order implications for monetary policy (Gaspar and Smets, 
2002; Orphanides and Willliams, 2004a). Inflation targeting can be 
particularly successful in reducing the latter risks by better anchoring 
inflation expectations under imperfect knowledge of key variables and 
private perception of monetary policy behavior.
The signal extraction problem that accompanies imperfect 
knowledge of key input or target variables causes both central 
banks and the private sector to learn gradually about the realization 
of shocks. This form of bounded rationality—a departure from 
rational  expectations—provides  a  plausible  framework  for 
modeling the behavior of central banks and private agents (Evans 
and Honkapohja, 2001) and seems to be empirically reasonable 
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(Orphanides and Williams, 2004b). Adaptive learning on the 
part of central banks implies that they will have a relatively 
muted response to cost-push shocks (Smets, 1999; Orphanides 
and Williams, 2002; Gerali and Lippi, 2002). When private 
sector expectations are determined by adaptive behavior, optimal 
monetary policy responds more persistently to cost-push shocks. The 
higher the private sector’s initially perceived inflation persistence, 
the stronger and more persistent is the optimal policy response 
(Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin, 2006).
When the central bank’s uncertainty about potential output leads 
to central bank learning behavior, the optimal choice of whether to 
target output growth, the price level, or inflation will depend on the 
weight of inflation stability and the degree of learning efficiency 
(Yetman, 2005). The interaction between private sector uncertainty 
about the central bank’s inflation target level (in other words, the 
central bank’s lack of credibility) and the central bank’s uncertainty 
regarding the private sector’s uncertainty about the inflation target 
can have serious implications for monetary policy, leading to policy 
errors and raising inflation persistence (Aoki and Kimura, 2005).
1.4 Transparency, Communication, and Accountability 
under Inflation Targeting
Transparency, communication, and accountability are key to 
successful inflation targeting. This belief has motivated inflation-
targeting central banks to undertake ongoing efforts to upgrade these 
three features of their policy framework (Roger and Stone, 2005). The 
recent analytical literature focuses increasingly on these features and 
their relation to monetary policy uncertainty and optimality. 
Optimal inflation targeting balances the need for accountability 
with monitoring capabilities (Walsh, 2003). If the central bank has 
little information about inflation shocks or if policy is transparent, then 
more weight should be placed on the inflation objective. Multiplicative 
uncertainty leads to more cautionary monetary policy (Brainard, 
1967), but it also raises the value of central bank accountability for 
achieving the inflation target (Walsh, 2003). If the private sector has 
diverse information about aggregate shocks, and if this information 
is less accurate than the central bank’s, then full transparency is 
generally optimal for inflation targeters, unless they are inflation 
nutters or put an excessive weight on output gap stability (Amato, 
Morris, and Shin, 2002; Walsh, 2005).
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1.5 Asset Prices and Monetary Policy under Inflation 
Targeting
A heated debate has taken place in recent years regarding the 
optimality of monetary policy—whether under inflation targeting or 
alternative monetary regimes—to react to asset prices or perceived 
asset price misalignment. Cecchetti and others (2000) argue that 
reacting to asset prices, in addition to inflation and the output gap, 
is likely to achieve superior performance and a smoother inflation 
path by reducing the likelihood of an asset price bubble. (This view 
was restated by Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani, 2002, in their 
response to some of the counterarguments presented next.) Much 
of the academic and policy literature reacted with skepticism to 
their proposal. Bernanke and Gertler (2001) contend that reacting 
to equity prices is counterproductive (over and above its effects 
on inflation and the output gap), while Batini and Nelson (2000) 
state that reacting to the exchange rate is not optimal (over and 
above its effects on inflation and the lagged interest rate). A related 
argument holds that since inflation-targeting central banks focus 
on inflation expectations, they need not target asset prices directly, 
but rather can use them to improve their prediction of the path of 
future inflation (Bean, 2003). 
Most inflation-targeting (and other) central banks have thus far 
sided with the skeptical view on monetary policy reaction to asset 
prices. Reasons for skepticism include the difficulty of measuring asset 
price misalignment, the difficulty of anticipating future asset price 
booms and busts or the future effects of preventive nonmonotonic 
policy actions, the difficulty in discriminating among different asset 
prices (such as housing prices, equity prices, and the exchange rate), 
and the possible dilution of the inflation objective.
1.6 Economic Performance under Inflation Targeting 
and in Comparison with Nontargeting Regimes
Empirical evidence on the links between inflation targeting and 
particular measures of economic performance generally supports the 
view that inflation targeting is associated with an improvement in 
overall economic performance (Bernanke and others, 1999; Corbo, 
Landerretche, and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002; Neumann and von Hagen, 
2002; Hu, 2003; Truman, 2003; Mishkin, 2006). In one of the few 
empirical papers critical of inflation targeting, Ball and Sheridan 
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(2005) argue that inflation targeting does not make a difference in 
industrial countries; rather, the apparent success of inflation-targeting 
countries simply reflects regression toward the mean. Ball and 
Sheridan’s findings are heavily disputed by Hyvonen (2004), Vega and 
Winkelried (2005), and IMF (2005), who present evidence—generated 
with different specifications and estimation techniques and based 
on samples that include emerging economies—that inflation levels, 
persistence, and volatility are lower in inflation-targeting countries.
Output volatility has not worsened after the adoption of inflation 
targeting; if anything, it has improved (Corbo, Landerretche, and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002). Evidence on inflation targeting’s impact on 
sacrifice ratios is also mildly favorable. Bernanke and others (1999) 
do not find that sacrifice ratios in industrialized countries fell with 
the adoption of inflation targeting, while Corbo, Landerretche, and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) conclude, based on a larger sample of inflation 
targeters, that inflation targeting did lead to an improvement in 
sacrifice ratios.
Bernanke and others (1999) and Levin, Natalucci, and Piger 
(2004) do not find that inflation targeting leads to an immediate 
fall in expected inflation, but Johnson (2002, 2003) does find some 
evidence that expected inflation falls after the announcement of 
inflation targets. However, inflation expectations appear to be 
better anchored for inflation targeters than nontargeters: inflation 
expectations react less to shocks to actual inflation for targeters than 
nontargeters, particularly at longer horizons (Gürkaynak, Levin, 
and Swanson, 2006; Levin, Natalucci, and Piger, 2004; Castelnuovo, 
Nicoletti-Altimari, and Rodríguez Palenzuela, 2003).
Finally, the evidence increasingly indicates that inflation 
targeters are successful in meeting their targets. A virtuous circle 
seems to be at work here, with inflation targeting being adopted in 
conjunction with institutional improvements that help strengthen 
monetary policy credibility. Central bank independence, fiscal 
policy credibility, overall institutional strength, and financial 
sector development all contribute to reducing the size of inflation 
target misses (Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003; Albagli and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2004; Gosselin, 2006). While inflation targets are 
never met exactly, the success and resilience of the regime—no 
country has dropped inflation targeting to date—are attributed to 
its flexibility and its improvements in monetary policy formalization 
and transparency (Roger and Stone, 2005).
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2. OVERVIEW OF THE VOLUME
Our selective review of the literature on inflation targeting suggests 
a significant number of open issues. Which further challenges are faced 
by economists and policymakers to lock in the benefits of low world 
inflation and minimize the transition costs toward inflation targeting 
in currently nontargeting countries? Is inflation targeting still optimal 
when considering real-world features of fiscal policy, like distortionary 
taxation and nonguaranteed intertemporal solvency? Which features 
of inflation targeting could be key when private knowledge of central 
bank goals and reactions is imperfect, raising the risk of endogenous 
drift of private expectations away from the central bank’s inflation 
goal? How is the Ramsey-optimal inflation level affected by the 
degree of price stickiness and the zero bound on the nominal interest 
rate—and which variables determine the Ramsey-optimal policy rule? 
How can central banks improve their current communication practice 
to raise the efficiency of monetary policy under inflation targeting? If 
the private sector has diverse information that is generally inferior 
to that of the central bank, what determines the optimal degree of 
policy transparency? 
How does output persistence affect the optimal weights of price-
level and inflation targeting, and what does cross-country data reveal 
about how close inflation targeters are to price-level targeting? What 
have been the benefits of inflation targeting for the world sample 
of targeting countries, in terms of macroeconomic performance and 
monetary policy efficiency, both over time and in comparison to 
successful nontargeters? What is the evidence on the pass-through 
of exchange rate devaluation to inflation, exchange rate volatility, and 
the role of the exchange rate in policy rules under inflation targeting? 
Are inflation expectations better anchored in inflation-targeting 
countries than in the United States? Has inflation targeting improved 
the anchoring of inflation and inflation expectations and reduced 
volatility in emerging economies—and are the results sensitive to a 
country’s having met preconditions at the start of inflation targeting? 
How important are real and nominal rigidities in explaining monetary 
policy and macroeconomic dynamics in Chile, and has the weight 
attached to inflation relative to output declined since the adoption of 
full-fledged inflation targeting in 1999? Finally, has Chile experienced 
changes in price rigidity, price indexation, devaluation-inflation pass-
through, and the policy rule since attaining full-fledged inflation 
targeting and stationary inflation?
02.Overview 01-22.indd 01/03/2007, 18:09 910 Frederic S. Mishkin and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
The papers in this volume address these thirteen questions. 
The introductory essay by Anne Krueger assesses the benefits of a 
low-inflation environment for the world economy. The author starts 
by reviewing the main costs of inflation—namely, how it distorts 
the calculus of profitability, encouraging short-term projects at 
the expense of longer-term investment and diminishing the value 
of relative price signals. She then reviews the progress that most 
countries have made in recent years toward achieving low inflation. 
The new low-inflation environment has brought noticeable gains—
faster global growth, increased stability, and reduced vulnerability. 
The role of the IMF in helping foster a low-inflation environment is 
also discussed, highlighting the Fund’s important support for policy 
reform efforts in its member countries. To conclude, Krueger identifies 
future challenges for economists and policymakers: locking in the 
benefits of low inflation, identifying how far policies should go toward 
lowering inflation further, and expanding the knowledge frontiers on 
the transition toward adopting inflation targeting.
Pierpaolo Benigno and Michael Woodford extend the theoretical 
literature on inflation targeting by focusing on the fiscal consequences 
of committing to an inflation target. They analyze the nature of an 
optimal monetary policy commitment under alternative assumptions 
about fiscal policy, ranging from distorting revenue to deviations from 
intertemporal insolvency. While the fiscal policy regime has important 
consequences for the optimal conduct of monetary policy, a suitably 
modified form of inflation targeting will still be a useful approach to 
optimal monetary policy. Benigno and Woodford show that the optimal 
targeting rule for monetary policy, which applies to the alternative 
fiscal regimes considered, involves commitment to an explicit target 
for an output-gap-adjusted price level. The optimal policy allows 
temporary deviations from the long-run target rate of economic 
growth in the gap-adjusted price level in response to disturbances that 
affect the government budget. However, such a policy also requires 
a commitment to return quickly to normal growth following these 
disturbances, so that medium-term inflation expectations remain 
firmly anchored despite the occurrence of fiscal shocks.
The paper by Athanasios Orphanides and John Williams 
reexamines the role of the key elements of the inflation-targeting 
framework in the context of an economy with imperfect knowledge. 
In their model, private agents attempt to infer the central bank’s 
goals and reactions through past actions. The novelty of the approach 
is that inflation expectations can endogenously drift away from the 
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central bank’s inflation goal. Using an estimated model of the U.S. 
economy, Orphanides and Williams show that monetary policy rules 
that would perform well under the assumption of rational expectations 
do very poorly when imperfect knowledge is introduced. The authors 
then examine the performance of an easily implemented policy rule 
that incorporates three key features of inflation targeting—namely, 
transparency, commitment to price stability, and close monitoring of 
inflation expectations—and find that all three play important roles 
in ensuring success. Their analysis suggests that simple difference 
rules excel at tethering inflation expectations near the central bank’s 
target and, in doing so, achieve superior stabilization of inflation and 
economic activity in an environment of imperfect knowledge.
Stephanie  Schmitt-Grohé  and  Martín  Uribe  study  the 
characterization and implementation of optimal monetary policy in the 
context of a medium-scale macroeconomic model that has been estimated 
to fit postwar U.S. business cycles. The main finding of the paper is that 
mild deflation is Ramsey-optimal in the long run. However, the optimal 
inflation rate appears to be highly sensitive to the assumed degree of 
price stickiness. This sensitivity disappears when lump-sum taxes are 
unavailable, in which case mild deflation is robustly optimal. In light 
of the result that the optimal inflation rate is negative, Schmitt-Grohé 
and Uribe find it puzzling that inflation-targeting countries pursue 
positive inflation goals. They also argue that the zero bound on the 
nominal interest rate, which is often cited as a rationale for a positive 
inflation target, is of no quantitative relevance in their model. Finally, 
the authors characterize operational interest rate feedback rules that 
best implement optimal stabilization policy and find that the optimal 
interest rate rule is sensitive to price and wage inflation, insensitive 
to output growth, and moderately inertial.
Lars Svensson claims in his paper that while inflation-targeting 
central banks have made impressive achievements, there is still ample 
room for progress in the development and effectiveness of this new 
regime. He explains that inflation-targeting central banks can improve 
their aim by being more specific, systematic, and transparent about 
their operational objectives (by using an explicit intertemporal loss 
function), their forecasts (by deciding on optimal projections of the 
instrument rate and the target variables), and their communication 
(by announcing optimal projections of the instrument rate and target 
variables). According to Svensson, further progress can be made by 
systematically incorporating central bank judgment and model 
uncertainty into the forecasting and decisionmaking process. In 
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particular, incorporating model uncertainty would lead central banks 
to engage in a more general “distribution forecast targeting” rather 
than the usual, more restrictive form of “mean forecast targeting” 
under the assumption of approximate certainty equivalence.
Carl Walsh extends the literature on central bank transparency 
under inflation targeting by exploring two dimensions of transparency 
that are typically overlooked: the quality of the information the 
central bank provides and how widely that information is publicized. 
Employing a simple new Keynesian framework with private and 
diverse information, Walsh finds that announcements about short-
run targets allow price setters to distinguish policy actions designed 
to offset demand shocks from those designed to partially offset the 
inflation effects of cost shocks. Announcements can thereby prevent 
demand shocks from affecting inflation, but private sector decisions 
become more sensitive to central bank forecast errors, raising inflation 
variability. It may then be advantageous for the monetary authority 
to make partial announcements. Walsh shows that the optimal 
degree of partial announcements depends on the persistence of cost 
and demand shocks, the relative weight of inflation and output gap 
objectives, and the information asymmetry between the central bank 
and the public. Full transparency is optimal for a central bank that 
has reasonable preferences (a central bank that is neither an inflation 
nor an output gap nutter) and has more accurate information than 
the private sector. 
The paper by Stephen G. Cecchetti and Stefan Krause revisits 
the relative merits of price-level targeting and inflation targeting. 
According to the authors, whether the optimal approach is pure 
inflation targeting, pure price-path targeting, or some hybrid depends 
on the country’s output persistence. Furthermore, any hybrid rule 
can be optimal once policymakers realize that the horizon for target 
evaluation can vary. For example, a rule that heavily weights inflation 
targeting but is evaluated over a long horizon will be equivalent to 
a rule that heavily weights price-path targeting but is evaluated 
over a shorter horizon. The authors confront these ideas empirically 
with data drawn from a large panel of countries. Their evidence 
shows that output and price-level persistence vary significantly 
across countries. Inflation targeters show a distinctly lower degree 
of price-level persistence than nontargeters. More generally, output 
persistence did not change much between the 1980s and the 1990s, 
whereas price-level persistence declined—possibly a result of inflation 
targeting—and the optimal horizon for target evaluation grew shorter. 
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Cecchetti and Krause conclude that countries may be closer to price-
path than to inflation targeting.
Frederic S. Mishkin and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel revisit the issue 
of whether inflation targeting is associated with an improvement in 
overall economic performance. They extend the previous empirical 
literature on this ongoing debate by focusing on a panel of data 
comprising the world population of inflation-targeting countries 
and a control group of high-achieving industrial economies that do 
not target inflation. The authors find that inflation targeting has 
helped inflation-targeting countries reduce their long-run inflation 
levels, diminish the inflation response to oil-price and exchange rate 
shocks, strengthen monetary policy independence, improve monetary 
policy efficiency, and lower the deviations of inflation outcomes from 
inflation goals. Many of these benefits increase once inflation targeters 
attain stationary target levels. Despite the improvements obtained 
by inflation targeters relative to their past performance, the evidence 
generally rejects the notion that inflation-targeting countries perform 
better than the control group of nontargeters. Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel show, however, that inflation targeting helps all country groups 
move toward control-group performance—and industrial inflation 
targeters’ performance is at the level of the control group.
Sebastian Edwards analyzes core issues on the relation between 
exchange rates and the inflation-targeting regime. He uses a dataset 
for two advanced and five emerging inflation-targeting economies to 
empirically address three issues: the relation between devaluation-
inflation pass-through and the effectiveness of the nominal exchange 
rate as a shock absorber (that is, the extent to which a nominal 
devaluation causes a real exchange rate depreciation); the effects 
of inflation targeting on exchange rate volatility; and the role of the 
exchange rate in monetary policy rules. Edwards finds that countries 
that have adopted inflation targeting have experienced a decline in the 
pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation—for both producer 
and consumer price (nontradables) inflation. He finds no evidence, 
however, of changes in the degree to which the nominal exchange 
rate acts as a shock absorber. Adoption of inflation targeting has 
not led to higher nominal or real exchange rate volatility, although 
adoption of exchange rate floats has increased the volatility of 
exchange rates in three out of five countries. Finally, Edwards 
reports a wide range of estimates of the effects of the exchange rate 
on central banks’ interest-setting behavior, ranging from nil (Chile) 
to high (Mexico).
02.Overview 01-22.indd 01/03/2007, 18:09 1314 Frederic S. Mishkin and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
The paper by Refet Gürkaynak, Andrew Levin, Andrew Marder, 
and Eric Swanson investigates the extent to which long-run inflation 
expectations are well anchored in three Western Hemisphere 
countries—namely, Canada, Chile, and the United States—based 
on a high-frequency event study. Their contribution to the literature 
consists in empirically verifying the success of inflation-targeting 
regimes in helping to anchor long-term inflation expectations. The 
authors use daily data on long-run forward inflation compensation 
measures—that is, the difference between forward rates on nominal 
and inflation-indexed bonds—as an indicator of financial-market 
perceptions of inflation risk and the expected level of inflation at 
long horizons. For the United States, Gürkaynak, Levin, Marder, 
and Swanson find that far-ahead forward inflation compensation 
reacts significantly to macroeconomic data releases, suggesting 
that long-run inflation expectations are not strongly anchored. 
In  contrast,  Canadian  and  Chilean  inflation  compensation 
data do not exhibit significant sensitivity to either domestic or 
external macroeconomic news, which is consistent with the view 
that inflation targeting in these two countries has succeeded in 
anchoring long-run inflation expectations.
Nicoletta Batini and Douglas Laxton analyze the effects of inflation 
targeting in emerging-market economies. They conducted a detailed 
survey of central banks, which they use to show that inflation targeting in 
emerging economies brings significant benefits compared with countries 
that adopt alternative nominal anchors (namely, monetary growth and 
exchange rate targets). They report that inflation targeters, unlike 
countries that pursue alternative monetary regimes, attain significant 
improvements in anchoring both inflation and inflation expectations, 
with no adverse effects on output performance; in reducing the volatility 
of interest rates, exchange rates, and international reserves; and in 
lowering the risk of currency crises. Batini and Laxton also find that 
countries do not have to meet a stringent set of institutional, technical, 
and economic preconditions before adopting inflation targeting for the 
subsequent success of this regime. In fact, most countries build up these 
conditions gradually after inflation targeting is in place. They show that 
the feasibility and success of inflation targeting instead depends on 
policymakers’ commitment and ability to plan and drive institutional 
change after introducing the new regime.
Rodrigo Caputo, Felipe Liendo, and Juan Pablo Medina develop a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to analyze the 
extent to which nominal and real rigidities play a role in explaining 
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the behavior of aggregate data in Chile. This issue is particularly 
important from a central banker’s perspective, since the existence (or 
absence) of certain rigidities may have important implications for the 
trade-off between output and inflation stabilization. Unlike previous 
DSGE models for Chile, their specification features habit formation, 
sticky prices and wages, price and wage indexation, and imperfect 
pass-through from the exchange rate to domestic prices of imports. 
Caputo, Liendo, and Medina use Bayesian techniques to estimate the 
model. Their main finding is that adding price and wage rigidities, 
wage indexation, and imperfect pass-through improves the fit of the 
model. Real rigidities, such as habit formation, also deliver a better 
account of aggregate data, although their effects are quantitatively 
small. Finally, their subsample analysis indicates that monetary 
policy has reacted less aggressively to inflation relative to output 
since 2000, suggesting a lower sacrifice ratio—a result they attribute 
to the increased credibility of full-fledged inflation targeting.
Luis Céspedes and Claudio Soto’s paper revisits the argument that 
inflation targeting in Chile has made a major contribution to lowering 
inflation to around 3 percent per year by enhancing the credibility of 
monetary policy. The authors use a new Keynesian Phillips curve to 
show that price rigidity has intensified in the past few years, while the 
degree of indexation in the economy has declined and the exchange 
rate pass-through to traded-goods inflation has fallen. They also find 
that the monetary policy rule has become more forward-looking in 
terms of inflation and more resolute in fighting inflation deviations 
from target. Céspedes and Soto’s findings are consistent with the 
notion that monetary policy credibility in Chile has been strengthened 
over time. As monetary policy has become more credible, costly price 
adjustments are undertaken less frequently, indexation based on past 
inflation has become less widespread, and the central bank has been 
able to fight inflation deviations from target more strongly and at 
lower output costs.
We end this introduction by summarizing selectively the main 
lessons drawn from our preview of the new findings on monetary 
policy and inflation targeting reported in this volume.
Countries considering adoption of inflation targeting should not 
wait to meet the stringent preconditions identified in older research 
and policy recommendations—the evidence shows that most countries 
build up these conditions gradually after adoption. Instead the success 
of inflation targeting depends on central banks’ commitment and ability 
to adopt institutional changes after introducing the new regime.
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On the optimal design of inflation-targeting regime parameters 
and rules, this volume presents novel analytical results. When fiscal 
regimes are considered, the optimal targeting rule for monetary policy 
involves commitment to an explicit target for an output-gap-adjusted 
price level. Then the optimal policy allows deviations in the gap-
adjusted price level in response to fiscal disturbances, which need to 
be temporary in order to allow medium-term inflation expectations to 
remain firmly anchored. Regarding the choice of the inflation-target 
level, mild deflation is Ramsey-optimal, but this inference depends on 
the degree of price stickiness and the availability of lump-sum taxes.
The choice between price-path, inflation-level targeting, or a hybrid 
rule depends on the degree of output persistence and the horizon for target 
evaluation. The optimal policy horizon is determined by the persistence 
of the shocks faced by central banks, the volatility of output, and the 
preferences of central bankers. The cross-country evidence suggests that 
the horizon for target evaluation has become shorter and that countries 
may be closer to price-path than to inflation targeting.
Macroeconomic performance has improved significantly and by large 
measures in inflation-targeting countries. After adopting the new regime, 
the level, persistence, and volatility of inflation have improved, output 
volatility has declined, monetary policy efficiency has improved, and 
inflation outcomes are closer to target levels. The response of inflation to 
oil-price and exchange-rate shocks is smaller and monetary policy rates 
are less responsive to international interest rates. Some of the latter 
benefits are larger when countries achieve stationary inflation targets. 
Most of the gains have been larger for emerging-economy targeters, 
although industrial-country targeters by-and-large perform better than 
emerging-economy targeters. However, macroeconomic performance of 
inflation targeters is generally not better than that of nontargeters like 
the United States, the Eurozone, and Japan. The one exception to the 
latter is on long-term inflation expectations, which seem to be better 
anchored in inflation-targeting countries (specifically in Canada and 
Chile) than in nontargeting countries (specifically the United States).
Inflation targeting and nontargeting central bankers alike face 
the challenge of dealing adequately with data and model uncertainty. 
Uncertainty implies that learning about data and models is key to 
understand the behavior of economic agents and central banks, as 
reflected in a growing body of theoretical and empirical research on 
monetary policy. This work shows that both monetary policy efficiency 
and consumer welfare increase when uncertainty and learning are 
explicitly considered in agents’ and central banks’ decisionmaking.
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Monetary policy rules that would perform well under the 
assumption of rational expectations do poorly when imperfect 
knowledge is introduced. Transparency, commitment to price stability, 
and close monitoring of inflation expectations play a key role in 
monetary policy under imperfect knowledge. In particular, simple 
difference rules are better in guiding expectations toward inflation 
target levels, reducing inflation and output volatility.
Transparency and communication are another areas where central 
banks—both inflation targeters and nontargeters—should aim at 
further improvements. Incorporating central bank judgment and 
model uncertainty explicitly into the forecasting and decisionmaking 
process—for example, engaging in “distribution forecast targeting” 
rather than the usual “mean forecast targeting”—would improve 
monetary policy efficiency further. Yet the optimal degree of central 
bank transparency is also shown to depend on the quality of information 
provided by the central bank and how widely that information is 
publicized. Full transparency is optimal under reasonable central bank 
preferences and when the central bank has more accurate information 
than the private sector.
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